2017级好意思国有计划硕士论文纲目av网址
[1] 陈丹丹
导师姓名：陈崛斌
华文题目：好意思国国会拉好意思裔本质性代表有计划----解放外侨政策的力量
英文题目：Latino Substantive Representation in the U.S. Congress---Toward a Liberated Immigration Policy
纲目
2003年，拉好意思裔东谈主口已成为好意思国最大的少数族裔。跟着好意思国东谈主口组成的变化，拉好意思裔外侨问题已成为政事舞台上的热点话题。特朗普上台后外侨政策徐徐成为拉好意思裔东谈主民的不幸，好意思国政事中越来越多的反拉好意思裔外侨言论使得外侨政策成为拉好意思裔的首要利益照看。跟着更多拉好意思裔议员入选国会，其比重在最新的116届国会达到最岑岭。在这种语境下，东谈主们越来越照看拉好意思裔议员与拉好意思裔利益之间的互动关系，即不断改善的描摹性代表是否意味拉好意思裔议员约略本质性代表拉好意思裔利益？拉好意思裔国会议员是否比非拉丁裔议员更好地代表拉丁裔的外侨权利？
本有计划以第115届和116届国会的拉好意思裔众议员为有计划对象来分析拉好意思裔描摹性代表与本质性代表之间的关系。通过网罗和分析拉好意思裔众议员筹商外侨法案的发起和国会演讲的数据，本文就拉好意思裔众议员对拉好意思裔的本质性代表举止和进度进行了有计划。外侨法案发起是本质性代表有计划中被世俗分析的举止，它不错灵验证据拉好意思裔众议员是否在政事举止中反应拉好意思裔利益偏好。而国会演讲是磨砺本质性代表的紧要渠谈，并提供对拉好意思裔众议员举止的紧要想法，约略愈加具体地了解拉好意思裔众议员举止背后的逻辑。
本有计划通过对外侨法案的发起和国会演说进行了定性和定量分析，发现拉好意思裔众议员比拟较非拉好意思裔议员而言往往更积极地通过法案发起来代表拉好意思裔外侨利益，他们在演说经由中更一致地抒发了拉好意思裔的不雅点和费心。有计划讲明，拉好意思裔议员通过扶持更多的外侨法案，是解放外侨政策的中坚力量。此外，拉好意思裔国会议员，不管地区，种族血缘和意志形态，在代表外侨利益方面曾经徐徐形成一股一致的合营力量。而这种孝顺在国会演讲中对拉好意思裔本质性代表至关紧要。基于此，本文觉得拉好意思裔议员的描摹性代表对于本质性代表拉好意思裔外侨利益至关紧要，拉好意思裔议员在政策议程制定和审议经由中大大增强了解放拉好意思裔外侨政策的竣事可能。
关节词：好意思国国会， 拉好意思裔众议员， 外侨法案，本质性代表
Abstract
In 2003， the Latinos have become the largest minority in the United States. With such demographic changes， Latino immigration issue has become a hot political topic ever since Trump took office. Trump’s ascent to power has made immigration policies a disaster for Latino immigrants and the increasing anti-Latino rhetoric in American politics have put immigration policies on the top of priorities of Latino community. With more Latino representatives elected to Congress has come increased interest in how Latino immigration interests are represented in Congress. Whether the improved Latino descriptive representation in congress enhances substantive representation in general and with regard to immigration policies in particular? Are Latinos better represented by Latino representatives than non-Latino representatives? The role that Latino representatives play to substantively representing Latino is being examined carefully in this paper.
In this study， Latino representatives in the 115th and 116th congresses are studied to access and evaluate the relationship between Latino descriptive representation and substantive representation. Data of immigration bill sponsorship and floor speeches are collected to examine substantive representation of Latino representatives. Bill sponsorship， a widely analyzed behavior in representation research， illustrates Latino representatives’ role in prioritizing policies that match Latino interests and reflect Latino preferences. Floor speeches can provide specific windows on representative patterns and offer important insight into the mindset and behaviors of Latino representation. Using a multi-method approach that included qualitative and quantitative analyses of immigration bill sponsorship and floor speeches， this study finds that Latino representatives are more active in representing Latino immigration issues through bill sponsorship and they speak for Latino perspectives during floor speeches more consistently. This study finds that Latino representatives have made more focused efforts to liberate immigration policy. Furthermore Latino representatives are showing a tendency to form a consistent frontier in representing immigration interest regardless of their region， ethnic origin， and ideology. Such united contributions are essential to Latino community during congressional floor speeches. This study concluded that Latino descriptive representatives are essential to substantive Latino representation and Latino representatives substantially enhances Latino representation in the process of policy agenda setting and deliberation.
Key Words: Latino representatives， substantive representation， immigration bill sponsorship， floor speeches
[2] 陈创
导师姓名：李期铿
华文题目：好意思国外侨更正立法僵局——第99届和109届国会对比有计划
英文题目：The Legislative Gridlock of Immigration Reform in the US: Comparing the 99th and the 109th Congress
纲目
外侨更恰是好意思国连年来最具争议性的话题之一。国会已通过了三部详尽性外侨更处死案，分袂是《1924年国度发祥法案》、《1965年外侨和国籍法案》和《1986年外侨更正和限制法》。自1986年以来，国会多少次详尽性外侨更正立法尝试均宣告失败，其中第109届国会的H.R.4437和S.2611被觉得是最引东谈主珍摄的立法尝试。本文从党间分歧和党内分歧的两个维度脱手，通过对比第99届国会S.1200（即《1986年外侨更正和限制法》）和第109届H.R.4437和S.2611的立法经由，分析这两个时刻出现不同远离的原因。本文主要接管了文献分析法、对比有计划法和历史有计划法，通过分析《国会记载》的议员讲话文本，结合记名投票远离等关系信息，得出以下论断。
在党间分歧维度，第109届国会两党在详尽性外侨更处死案上的分歧高大于在普通法案上的分歧，而第99届国会两党在两种法案上的分歧不大。从两党成员的角度分析，从第99届到第109届，按照党派属性进行投票的议员比例高潮，党间分歧显贵扩大。第109届国会极化的进度也远高于第99届，参谋院两党在这个议题上并未结成安定的定约，小领域的合营仅限于共和党解放派和民主党。而且，国会在不同议题上极化的进度不一，外侨议题上极化进度的波动远高于其他主要议题。
在党内分歧维度，S.1200莫得受到党内分歧的彰着影响，但是H.R.4437和S.2611更多地受到了共和党里面分歧的负面影响。参谋院和众议院通过了各自版块的详尽性外侨更处死案，不肯彼此协调。众议院共和党东谈主和参谋院共和党保守派愈加救助H.R.4437，而两院民主党东谈主和参谋院共和党解放派愈加救助S.2611，两院之间的分歧本质上开首于共和党里面的交游。众议院共和党东谈主比参谋院共和党东谈主愈加救助H.R.4437；参谋院南边共和党东谈主愈加救助H.R.4437，而朔方共和党东谈主愈加救助S.2611。多种要素重复，导致第109届国会详尽性外侨更正最终失败。
总的来说，第99届国会详尽性外侨更正立法尝试主要受党间分歧的影响，两党结成的安定定约压过了这种分歧的负面影响，使得法案最终生效，而第109届国会详尽性外侨更正立法僵局受到了党间分歧和共和党里面分歧的双重巨大影响，且分歧进度远高于第99届国会，这导致了第109届的详尽性外侨更正立法尝试以失败告终。本文成心于增进对好意思国国会外侨立法经由的结伴，理清1986年之后好意思国国会对外侨议题格调的变化，以及党派分歧对外侨立法的影响进度，以便对解读现时好意思国国会外侨更正逆境提供一些启示。
关节词：外侨更正；国会；立法；党派分歧
Abstract
Immigration reform has been one of the most controversial topics in the U.S. in recent years. The Congress has passed three comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bills: the National Origins Act of 1924， the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965， and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Since 1986， several legislative attempts of CIR bills have failed in the Congress， among which H.R.4437 and S.2611 in the 109th Congress were said to be the most noticeable. Through comparing the legislation of S.1200 (i.e. the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986) in the 99th and H.R.4437 and S.2611 in the 109th Congress from the dimension of inter-party division and the dimension of intra-party division， this thesis explores why the legislative attempts of CIR bills in the two periods yielded distinct results. Mainly by document analysis， historical and comparative study methods， this thesis draws the following conclusions by analyzing the text of congresspersons’ speeches and related information like roll call vote records.
On the first dimension， in the 109th Congress the two parties were more divergent in CIR bills than in other bills， whereas in the 99th Congress the divergence between the two parties in the two types of bills was not significant. From the perspective of party members， the percentages of Congressmembers voting along the party line increased remarkably from the 99th Congress to the 109th， meaning the discord between the two parties increased tremendously. Furthermore， the Congress was more polarized in the 109th Congress than in the 99th. The two parties in the Senate did not form a solid coalition， with the small-scale unity limited to the liberal side of Republicans and Democrats. Besides， the degrees of polarization on different issues in the Congress were different. The fluctuation of the degree of polarization on the issue of immigration was far more dramatic than that on other major issues.
On the second dimension， the legislation of S.1200 in the 99th Congress was not considerably influenced by intra-party division. But the legislation of H.R.4437 and S.2611 were more negatively influenced by internal conflicts of the Republican Party. The two chambers of the 109th Congress passed their own versions of CIR bills， unwilling to compromise. House Republicans and the conservative side of Senate Republicans supported H.R.4437 more， whereas Democrats from the two chambers and the liberal side of Senate Republicans endorsed S.2611 more. The conflicts between the two chambers actually originated in the internal dissension of the Republican Party. House Republicans supported H.R.4437 more than Senate Republicans did. In the Senate， Republicans from the Southern States supported H.R.4437 more， while those from the Northern States preferred S.2611. With various factors combined， the legislative attempts of immigration reform in the 109th Congress finally failed.
In short， the success of the legislative attempts of comprehensive immigration reform in the 99th Congress were attributed to the solid bipartisan coalition overshadowing the negative impacts of inter-party divisions by which the bills were majorly influenced， whereas the legislative gridlock of that in the 109th Congress was significantly influenced by both inter-party divisions and intra-party divisions of the Republicans. The divisions in the latter period were far sharper than that in the former period， which resulted in the final failure of the legislative attempts of comprehensive immigration reform in the 109th Congress. This thesis contributes to the understanding of the immigration legislation process in the U.S. Congress， the changes of attitudes of the U.S. Congress toward immigration issues since 1986， and the influence of party divisions on immigration legislation， so as to proffer some inspiration for the interpretation of the contemporary dilemma of immigration reform in the U.S. Congress.
Key words: immigration reform; Congress; legislation; party division
[3] 王芯莹
导师姓名：李莉文
华文题目：特朗普在朝时刻好意思国联邦政府停摆的原因分析
英文题目：Why Federal Government Shut Down during the Trump Administration?
纲目
由于财政断流而酿成的政府停摆在好意思国历史上日出不穷，而好意思国均权制衡的轨制又使得这一危境难以得到压根搞定。自1980年卡特政府第一次“关门”以来，好意思国联邦政府所阅历的停摆已有16次，而这其中绝大大量齐发生在分裂政府时刻。两党相争当作好意思国政事体制的紧要特色，同期也结合了每次政府停摆。
在这个配景下，特朗普在朝时刻的两次政府停摆则因其具备的不同以往的新特色而引起了世俗照看。率先，特朗普政府在停摆发生之时并非分裂政府，总统以及国会大量党均为共和党，这是自1980年卡特政府停摆后38年里出现的第一次一致政府下的停摆。其次，2018-2019年联邦政府停摆，即特朗普政府的第二次停摆，共历时35天，是好意思国历史上为期最长的一次停摆。这些齐使得特朗普在朝时刻的政府停摆具有有计划的预料和价值。
本文旨在对特朗普政府第二次停摆的原因进行分析，借助Nierenberg的谈判需求表面框架，聚焦财政预算谈判中当作主要谈判方的民主党与共和党、以及党内东谈主士的不同需求，为其不同的态度及不雅点作念出解释。本文的论点及论据主要开首于对关系政府文献、媒体报谈、议员说辞等作念出的文分内析。
这次政府停摆的关节在于两党对于特朗普建议的57亿好意思元的边境墙拨款存在异议。一方面，两党选民结构在近几十年内不断变化，为了自身的糊口与发展，两党对于外侨问题以及边境墙的建立推崇出天渊之别的格调。另一方面，共和党里濒临于边境墙拨款以及“核选项”的使用也出现了分歧，这使得共和党丧失了国会两院大量党的优势，难以得手通过财政预算并最终导致了联邦政府的停摆。在政府停摆的后期阶段，国度收复秩序的需求以及好意思国大家对于回反时常生活的需求越来越强，促使两党作念出协调，末端了这次停摆。
关节词：政府停摆、谈判需求表面、边境墙拨款、外侨问题、两党之争
Abstract
Government shutdowns caused by funding gap have frequently occurred in American history， and the U.S. system of check and balance makes it difficult to thoroughly resolve this problem. Since the Carter administration first shut down the government in 1980， the U.S. federal government has experienced 16 shutdowns in total， the vast majority of which have occurred under the split government. Party struggle， as an important feature of the American political system， also runs through every government shutdown.
In this context， the two government shutdowns under the Trump administration have attracted widespread attention due to their new characteristics. Firstly， the U.S. government was not in the split state when the shutdown began. The President and the majority party in Congress were both Republicans. This is the first unified government shutdown in the 38 years after the Carter government shutdown in 1980. Secondly， the 2018-2019 federal government shutdown， which is the second shutdown under the Trump administration， has lasted for 35 days， appearing to be the longest government shutdown in American history. All the above makes the Trump government shutdown worth discussing.
This thesis attempts to analyze the reasons for the second government shutdown under the Trump administration. By using Nierenberg’s Need Theory of Negotiation， this thesis will focus on the different needs of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as some of their members in the budget negotiation， and make explanations for their distinct attitudes. And the arguments mainly come from the textual analysis of relevant government documents， media reports and Congressional members’ words， etc.
The trigger for the government shutdown is the dispute between the two parties over Trump’s $ 5.7 billion border wall appropriation proposed in the budget bill. On the one hand， the demographic structure of both parties have changed rapidly in the past few decades. For the survival and development of their own， both parties showed entirely different attitudes towards immigration issue and border wall building.
On the other hand， the internal disagreement of the Republican party on the border wall as well as the use of “nuclear option” made it lose the advantage of being the majority party in both Houses in the Congress， which also made it hard for passing the budget bill and led to the long government shutdown. At the final stage of the shutdown， the need of the nation to restore order and the need of Americans for security and normal life became increasingly significant， leading to the compromise the both parties and the end of the shutdown.
Key words: government shutdown， Need Theory of Negotiation， border wall appropriation， immigration issue， party struggle
[4] 杨博源
导师姓名：陈崛斌
华文题目：特朗普政府时刻中好意思汇集安全合作失败经由与原因探析
英文题目：Failed China-U.S. Cybersecurity Cooperation under Trump: How and Why
纲目
在现在国际社会中，汇集安全问题愈发受到照看，中好意思汇集安全合作更是这一领 域的紧要议题。中好意思两国曾经在多种国际机制框架内试图鼓励汇集安全合作。在奥巴马政府时刻，两国曾经达成诸多双边合同，初步建立了对话机制，取得了特地的成效。关联词，特朗普政汉典台后，中好意思汇集安全合作知难而退。本文照看的主要问题就在于此：特朗普政府时刻中好意思汇集安全合当作何无法督察和鼓励？
本文接管罗伯特·基欧汉的轨制解放宗旨当作表面框架。基欧汉觉得，灵验的国际机制约略促进国际合作，国际机制的灵验性又建立在褂讪的彼此依赖关系之上，而彼此依赖关系受制于三个影响要素：明锐性和脆弱性、议题筹商和多渠谈交流。本文主要接管说话分析的有计划要领，在意收用政府文献与陈诉、新闻报谈、关系国际机制信息等材料来分析中好意思两边在汇集安全问题上的诉求及中好意思汇集安全合作的逆境。
本文觉得，既有国际机制无法灵验促进中好意思汇集安全合作，主如果由于存在以下四个方面存在弱势。第一，联接国框架下的汇集安全机制仍属新闯事物，机制诞生仍有待完善。在这种不完善的机制下，中好意思在汇集安全问题上存在根分内歧，难以就国际轨范达成共鸣。第二，在其他国际多边经济机制中，汇集安全问题往往居于次要隘位，且偏向于照看汇集安全问题经济的一面。第三，在互联网非政府组织中，主要问题是政府参与度不够，非政府组织对政府举止的影响有限。第四，固然中好意思两边曾在奥巴马在朝时刻建立了一些汇集安全双边对话机制，但是由于缺少退出机制末端、且两国派出的代表在专科性和级别上也分歧等，因此效果有限。
通过分析特朗普政府筹商汇集安全议题的文献和陈诉，本文觉得这种机制失效的根源在于特朗普上台后中好意思适宜彼此依赖的变化。率先，由于中国在高技术规模和顶端制造业的快速发展，好意思国对中国明锐性增强。特朗普政府把中国视作“竞争敌手”而非伙伴，全体对华政策偏向缔结派。又由于在中好意思彼此依赖中，中国对好意思国的脆弱性更强，因此特朗普政府从这种分歧称彼此依赖中赢得了权力，并有富足意愿对中国欺诈这种权力。其次，特朗普政府接管议题筹商策略，强化了汇集安全问题中的国度安全维度，将其政事化，这有别于此前中好意思两边齐强调汇集安全的期间层面搞定决策的作念法。终末，由于特朗普政府介入过多政事妙技，给中好意思汇集安全合作其他渠谈设障，导致非政府合作渠谈受阻。
对中国来说，搞定此问题有三种对应决策。第一，缩短自身对好意思国的脆弱性。中国不错通过进一步增强自主研发智力缩短对好意思国高技术家具的依赖，或者与其他国度合作，建立有别于好意思国主张的国际汇集安全轨范。第二，中国连接坚捏期间问题和政事问题脱钩，拒却将中好意思汇集安全争端政事化。第三，中好意思应该尝试从非官方、低层级的筹商运行收复，并保证仍然灵验的筹商渠谈不被远离。
关节词：汇集安全；中好意思合作；特朗普政府；复合彼此依赖；政事化
Abstract
As a new domain for international cooperation and competition， the cyberspace and its security have been drawing more and more attention from all the countries. In cyberspace， China-U.S. cooperation and competition on cybersecurity are very important. China and the United States once made great efforts to realize bilateral cybersecurity cooperation within the frameworks of many international regimes. During the Obama Administration， China and the U.S. reached a series of agreements， built the dialogue mechanism and achieved remarkable accomplishments. However， after President Trump took office， the China-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation fell into suspension. This dissertation is an inquiry into this question: Why China and the United States can’t sustain and continue the cooperation on cybersecurity during the Trump administration?
In order to answer this question， this research adopts Robert Keohane’s institutional liberalism as theoretical framework. According to Keohane， international cooperation can be facilitated by functional international regimes. Functional international regimes are built on stable interdependence relationship， which is affected by three factors: sensitivity and vulnerability， issue-linkage and multiple channels. Discourse analysis is selected as the research method. Materials including key official documents， mainstream coverage and basic information about international regimes are adopted to analyze the resorts of China and the U.S. on cybersecurity issue and the obstacles to their cooperation in this field.
Existing international regimes have failed to facilitate the U.S.-China cybersecurity cooperation due to the following flaws. First， cybersecurity regimes under the UN framework are still a working process， far from be perfect， unable to reconcile the essential V divergences between China and the United States on cybersecurity issue. Such divergences complicate the efforts on both sides to reach any consensus on establishing international norms. Second， in other international economic multilateral regimes， the cybersecurity problem is usually put to the sideline of the agenda. Besides， these regimes， by nature， is more inclined to prioritize the economic dimension of cybersecurity. Third， in cyberspace oriented NGOs， governmental participation is often half-hearted with little， if not none， dedication. The limited influence of NGOs on government behavior has led their rather insightful recommendations lay futile. Fourth， although China and the United States did build a dialogue mechanism on cybersecurity during the Obama Administration， this regime， for its lack of provisions on the withdrawal， plays no restrictive role in case a signatory wishes to leave the pack. Moreover， the actual policy significance of the representatives from both sides is marginal due to the non-equivalence in terms of expertise and seniority.
By analyzing the Trump Administration’s government documents and reports on cybersecurity issue， this thesis argues that the root cause of the regime dysfunction lies in changing China-U.S. complex interdependence. First， the United States has become more sensitive to China’s leaps and bounds in high-technology and advanced manufacturing. The Trump Administration is determined to perceive China as a “competitor” rather than a partner like Obama did and has， accordingly， toughened its overall stance toward China. Moreover， since China has greater vulnerability than America in China-U.S. complex interdependence， the Trump Administration gains power over China from this asymmetric interdependence and has the will to make full use of it when dealing with China. Second， the Trump Administration adopts the issue-linkage strategy to politicize cybersecurity， especially by prioritizing the national security dimension of cybersecurity， which is a marked diversion from the previous bilateral consensus that cybersecurity is primarily an issue with a technological solution. Third， the multiple channels between China and the United States are obstructed due to Trump’s excessive political interference; that is， various unofficial but once functional channels for cooperation are blocked.
Against this backdrop， China has three options. First， China can decrease its vulnerability to the United States by continuing its development in advanced manufacturing and further reducing its dependence on American high-tech products， or by cooperating with other states to establish international cybersecurity norms exclusive of the United States. Second， China continues to insist on and work on open-source technological solutions to the cybersecurity problem. Third， China and the United States should endeavor to restart the connections， and probably first at low levels.
Key Words: Cybersecurity， China-U.S. cooperation， the Trump Administration， complex interdependence， politicization.
[5] 冯家顺
导师姓名：闫循华
华文题目：特朗普政府对海外汇集安全阻挠的支吾---新古典现实宗旨视角
英文题目：U.S. Responses to Foreign Cybersecurity Threats during the Trump Administration: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation
纲目
特朗普自当选好意思国总统以来，对好意思国的汇集安全政策进行了一系列转机，在汇集安全政策的方针，妙技以及汇集安全要点方面相较奥巴马政府有很大不同，其中最引东谈主珍摄的便是带有浓厚的“大国竞争”钤记。针对来自中国和俄罗斯的汇集阻挠，特朗普政府选用了一系列更富“焦灼性”的汇集安全政策，比如将中国高技术企业华为列入“实体清单”以及针对俄罗斯干豫2016年好意思国大选而制裁一系列个东谈主及实体。现时国表里学术界精深要点有计划特朗普本东谈主对于好意思国汇集安全政策制定的影响，而忽略了国际、国内要素的影响。基于此，本文费力于有计划特朗普政府出台的一系列处分性汇集安全政策背后的机制。
本文借助新古典现实宗旨构建分析的表面框架，照看国际和国内两个档次，何况隆起好意思国精英领路以及国内轨制，尤其是总统与国会之间的互动在国内层面线路的作用。本文以中国和俄罗斯为例，着眼于特朗普政府出台的一系列政策、政策、法律，以及包括行政令以及总统领导在内的总统文献，通过案例分析以及文分内析建立国际要素和国内要素的互动，以及国内汇集安全互动的筹商。
有计划远离发现：特朗普政府针对中国和俄罗斯出台的一系列处分性政策背后，是国内精英领路与权力互动的远离，精英领路的一致与否形成了国内权力互动的不同模式。在中国华为问题上，好意思国精英层一致觉得华为对好意思国国度安全组成阻挠，因此在国会立法以及特朗普政府政策制定方面运行流畅，立法与行政两层彼此合作，促进华为禁令的出台；针对俄罗斯干豫好意思国2016年总统大选问题，好意思国精英层就俄罗斯干豫大选、特朗普串通俄罗斯政府方面存在分歧。特朗普以过甚共和党内的部分救助者否定上述指控，而民主党东谈主以及特朗普的党内反对者觉得俄罗斯干豫好意思国大选对好意思国民主体系以及国度安全组成实委果在的阻挠，继而条件严厉的对俄制裁。国内精英层面的分歧导致制裁俄罗斯干豫大选的法案常常流产，以及特朗普政府在落实政策上的懈怠。
通过构建好意思国汇集安全政策制定的解释框架，本文弥补了国内针对好意思国政府汇集安全政策分析的系统性缺失，对更全面地结伴特朗普政府的络安全政策转机具有模仿预料。
刘亦菲 ai换脸关节词：汇集安全，精英领路，权力互动，华为，好意思国大选
Abstract
The Trump administration has made a series of adjustments on the U.S. cybersecurity strategy after the 2016 presidential election， which is in many ways different from the Obama administration， and the most striking feature is “Great Power Competition.” The Trump administration has adopted a series of “offensive” cybersecurity policies in response to threat from China and Russia. For example， the administration added Chinese technology enterprise Huawei into “Entity List”， and imposed a series of sanctions on individuals and entities related to Russian meddling with the 2016 presidential election. The existing research focus on the Trumpian characteristics in his cybersecurity policy at large， while neglect the contribution of international and domestic factors. Against this background， this paper seeks to explain the mechanism behind the punitive cybersecurity polices issued by the Trump administration.
Based on a Neoclassical Realist framework， this paper attaches great importance to the domestic and international factors， and focuses on the role domestic elites’ perception， and domestic institutions， particularly interactions between the President and Congress， play in policymaking. With cases studies of China and Russia， this paper explores the interactions between international and domestic levels， and analyzes the role domestic institutions play in cybersecurity policymaking using textual analysis of the Trump administration’s cybersecurity policies， strategies， legislations， and other presidential documents such as executive orders and presidential directives， etc.
This paper argues that elite perception and interactions between domestic institutions are accountable for the punitive cybersecurity policies adopted by the Trump administration. The cohesiveness of elite perception leads to different patterns of interactions among domestic institutions， especially between the legislature and the executive branch. In the case of China， a cohesive perception can be found among the political elites， that Huawei posed a national security threat to the United States， which leads to an active congressional legislation and policymaking in the Trump administration. The executive branch and legislative worked together to formulate the ban on Huawei. In the case of Russia， the political elites are dissident and divided on Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and Trump’s collusion with the Russian government. Trump and his Republican-supporters dismiss the above accusations， whereas Democrats and some Republicans in Congress regard Russia as severe threat to the U.S. democratic system and national security， thereby requiring harsh policies against Russia. The disagreement resulted in the abortion of a series of bills aimed at deterring the United States from Russian cybersecurity threat， and the weak policy implementation of the Trump administration.
This paper contributes to the academic discussions on reasons behind the U.S. cybersecurity policy adjustments by filling the void of a systematic analytical framework， and may help readers to have a more comprehensive understanding of why and how the Trump administration makes cybersecurity adjustments
Key words: Cybersecurity， Elites’ perception， Domestic institutions， Huawei， Presidential election
[6] 汤妮
导师姓名：闫循华
华文题目：对于好意思国2002年决定在阿富汗战场选用“轻脚印”政策的官僚政事有计划
英文题目：A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the US Adoption of the Light Footprint Approach in Afghanistan in 2002
纲目
好意思国在阿富汗的干戈曾经捏续了18年之久，而好意思国在推翻塔利班政权后在阿富汗战场选用的“轻脚印政策”频繁被视为是导致干戈拖延于今的原因之一，关联词却少有东谈主探究好意思国政府当年为何决定在阿富汗接管该政策。事实上，后者是个很值得有计划的问题。即使这一政策与干戈近况无关，只是当作好意思国在后塔利班时期在阿富汗战场最早期的政策性决策，其成因也值得探究。通过结伴这一政策性决策的形成，能更好地了解布什政府里濒临于阿富汗干戈的关系决策机制。
有限的文献比较朦胧地将该决策归结为好意思国政府为达成在阿富汗的特定方针所采纳的一种合理妙技。明白这些解释齐是在感性决策模式表面框架下的推行。它们在好多问题上给出的解释暧昧不清或者难以语焉概略。笔者觉得这些在感性决策模式表面框架下对该决策作念出的解释并莫得很好地探究决策形成的原因，于是笔者决定从另一个角度切入该问题。
为了更好地结伴好意思国2002年在阿富汗战场选用“轻脚印政策”的决策的形成经由，本文接管了官僚政事模式的表面视角来有计划该问题。本文建构的官僚政事模式表面框架接受了格雷厄姆·艾利森的官僚政管表面有计划框架，围绕四个照看点张开：参与决策的主要决策者、决策者在其中的态度、决策者领有的权力及开首、和决策经由的张开。本文的表面框架与艾利森的表面框架一样强调部门个人宗旨在决策经由中的影响力。关联词，本文避让了时常与官僚政管表面详细筹商的机构决定论，隆起了在决策经由中起作用的东谈主为要素，即决策经由中决策者所具备的个体能动性。另外，本文将传统的官僚政事有计划与总统-参谋人关系有计划相结合，以完善官僚政管表面框架。
从官僚政事的角度看，本文觉得好意思国于2002年作念出的在后塔利班时期的阿富汗战场选用“轻脚印政策”的决策更多的是布什政府里面官僚政事博弈的远离，而非如感性决策模式所觉得的是一个价值最大化的选项；同期本文发现在决策经由中，个东谈主要素和系统要素相通紧要。同期受到部门偏好和由以前阅历及特定不雅念导致的个东谈主偏好的影响，紧要决策者，即鲍威尔、拉姆斯菲尔德、和赖斯，他们各平缓该议题上的态度是适宜期待的；在采纳态度的经由中，各决策者的自主权不一，也便是说，个东谈主偏好在其中的影响力不一，这是受到部门是否有一请安见和决策者个性两个要素的制约。决策者在政府部门的位置是他们在议题筹划中主导议题筹划标的的权力的主要开首。在这种权力的救助下，决策者积极地参与到一系列围绕具体事件张开的辩护中，这些辩护最终会导向好意思国在后塔利班时期的阿富汗战场选用“轻脚印政策”这一紧要政策性决策。对于权力的开首，值得扎眼的另极少是，决策者们自身是否故意愿充分利用他们具有的谈判优势和他东谈主是否定为决策者具有谈判优势并故意愿充分利用该优势也会影响到决策者主导议题的施行权力。在通盘关系的辩护中，本文荒谬照看与两个事件关系的辩护，它们分袂是2002年头国际安全拯救军队延伸的可能性辩论和同庚春帕查·汗·扎德兰挑战卡尔扎伊临时政府巨擘。决策者针对这两个事件好意思国所应选用的反应张开的辩护及远离促成了“轻脚印政策”的定型。决定选用“轻脚印政策”很猛进度上适宜拉姆斯菲尔德的期待。这主要由于拉姆斯菲尔德领有更好的谈判筹码何况他本人是个坚捏己见的用权者。关联词，即使是拉姆斯菲尔德也需要作念出铩羽以达成合同。在通盘这个词经由中，个东谈主要素如性情、阅历、不雅念，与系统要素如部门偏好和博弈法规，对最终决策的产生线路相通紧要的作用。
通过从官僚政管表面的角度去结伴好意思国布什政府2002年在阿富汗战场选用“轻脚印政策”的决策，本文但愿能第一，通过隆起个体能动性在决策经由中起的作用以晋升官僚政管表面对酬酢决策的解释力；第二，提供一个新的视角去结伴阿富汗干戈和好意思海酬酢决策机制。
关节词：阿富汗干戈；轻脚印政策；官僚政事有计划；个体能动性；好意思海酬酢决策
Abstract
The Afghanistan war has been dragging on for more than 18 years. The light footprint approach the US initially adopted in Afghanistan after removing the Taliban from power is sometimes blamed for resulting in the current state of the war， yet the reason why the approach was adopted has not received adequate attention. Actually， even if this decision was not partially responsible for the current state of the war， merely being the earliest strategic decision the US made for its role in the post-Taliban Afghanistan war is enough to make it a topic worthy of exploring， as it sheds light on the decision-making mechanism inside the Bush administration regarding the Afghanistan war.
The limited scholarship that touches upon the topic generally explains it away as a means to an end—a reasonably choice to achieve certain objective. Apparently those explanations were structured under the framework of the rational actor theory of decision-making. The author found those explanations far from satisfactory as they leave questions unanswered. Therefore， the author decided to approach the issue from another angle.
In order to understand the US decision to go light footprint in Afghanistan in 2002， the paper looks at the issue through a bureaucratic politics lens. The bureaucratic politics model the paper establishes inherits the analytical framework of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model which revolves around four focuses: decision-makers in the decision-making process， their stances， their power， and how the process unfolds that leads to the final decision. It also retains Allison’s model’s emphasis on parochialism. However， it rejects the institutional determinism that is easily associated with the bureaucratic politics analysis and instead highlights the human element at work in the decision-making process， specifically the individual agency decision-makers possess in making the decision. What’s more， it also refines the bureaucratic politics analysis by incorporating president-advisor analysis into the bureaucratic politics framework.
From the perspective of the bureaucratic politics， the paper finds that the US decision to adopt the light footprint approach as its strategy in the post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2002 was more of the result of the bureaucratic bargaining games that happened inside the Bush administration than a value-maximizing alternative as the rational actor theory suggests; and that personal factors play a role as significant as systemic factors in delivering the result. Under the influence of both institutional preference and personal preference resulting from past experience and personal beliefs， the respective stance key decision-makers， namely Powell， Rumsfeld， and Rice， picked was to be expected， though the degree of each decision-maker’s autonomy varies， and depends on the (non-)existence of institutional consensus and their personality. Backed by their power mainly endowed on them by their positions， they were engaged in a series of case-oriented debates that would eventually lead to the determination of the light footprint approach as the US strategy in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. It should be noted that their power can also be influenced by their willingness to make the best use of their bargaining advantage and their counterparts’ perception of their advantage and the effectiveness of their usage of advantage. Among all related debates， the paper specifically examines the debates about the US response to the ISAF expansion and the Pacha Khan Challenge. The light footprint approach was largely decided in favor of Rumsfeld， mainly because he possessed better bargaining chips and he was a willful power wielder. But even Rumsfeld had to make concessions to reach the deal. In the whole process， personal factors like personality， past experience and personal beliefs are as important as systemic factors like institutional preference and the rules of the game in delivering the decision.
Hopefully the paper would first， by highlighting the individual agency in the analysis， develop the bureaucratic politics analysis in a way that it could better explain the decision-making process; and second， provide a fresh perspective to understand the Afghanistan war and the US foreign policy decision-making mechanism.
Key words: the Afghanistan war; the light footprint approach; bureaucratic politics analysis; individual agency; the US foreign policy decision-making
[7] 苏协怡
导师姓名：李莉文
华文题目：好意思国对于《巴黎协定》的表象决策：基于双层博弈视角的分析
英文题目：Analysis of U.S. Policy on the Paris Agreement Based on the Two-Level Game Theory
纲目
好意思国总统奥巴马在其任期内耐久公开暗示积极支吾表象变化，并在第二任期内签署《巴黎协定》，这一确立也被视为奥巴马政府的主要表象遗产。关联词接任的特朗普总统在好意思国表象政策上“开倒车”，在上任的半年内即文书退出《巴黎协定》，生效剖析奥巴马政府的国际表象效果，体现了奥巴马政府表象遗产的脆弱性。本文围绕以下问题张开有计划：奥巴马政府和特朗普政府在《巴黎协定》上的两次决策是如何促成的？
本文试图利用双层博弈表面解释奥巴马和特朗普两任好意思国总统在《巴黎协定》上所作念出的天渊之别的决定，从好意思国政府的视角分析其在国际和国内层面上的双层博弈，何况得出论断：双层博弈表面对好意思国在《巴黎协定》上的两次决策具有邃密的解释力，且国际要素、国内要素和主要谈判者在两次决策中线路了不同进度的作用。
双层博弈表面对奥巴马政府的表象决策具有邃密解释力，且国际要素、国内要素和主要谈判者齐在政府决策经由中线路了紧要作用。在国际层面上，奥巴马政府追求重塑好意思国在全球表象管理上的携带力，通过文书《中好意思联接表象宣言》和答允向绿色表象基金出资30亿好意思元开释积极信号，扩大与欧盟及发展中国度等主要参与国达成合同的可能性。在国内层面，奥巴马政府文书《清洁电力揣测》与国际表象举止相呼应，科技产业、清洁动力产业和环保团体的救助也在一定进度上促成了政府的国际举止。关联词共和党限制的国会和传统动力行业对此捏反对格调。濒临国内阻力，当作主要谈判者，奥巴马选用“问题从头界定”及“协同问题联动”的策略来扩大国内的得手集会，关联词得手集会仍不及以赢得国内批准。这也迫使奥巴马政府决定通过行政命令的步地加入《巴黎协定》，并未将该协定递交参谋院批准。这一决定同期简化了退外出径，加强了这一效果的脆弱性。传统动力行业在反对无效之后，在2016年总统大选中转而救助共和党候选东谈主，也为该协定的出息加多了不细目性。
双层博弈表面对于特朗普政府的退出决定相通具有邃密的解释力。在这一决策经由中，国际要素线路了次要作用，而国内要素和主要谈判者线路了紧要作用。在国际层面上，特朗普政府觉得《巴黎协定》本人存在弱势，何况在国际表象谈判中推崇绝望。后续的马拉喀什表象大会、波恩表象大会和G7峰会使得特朗普政府相识到该协定的根人道弱势难以改动，从头谈判的可能性也聊胜于无。特朗普政府的这一决定更猛进度上反应了好意思国国内的博弈。特朗普政府的内阁组成成员多为表象怀疑论者，为了安定下层选民的救助，重振好意思国经济和服务，特朗普政府逆转了上届政府的表象政策；国会的主流声息也敦促特朗普政府退出该协定。关联词利益集团中救助留在该协定的声息占了优势，石油自然气行业与煤碳行业巨头逆转先前的格调，为了保留在全球将来动力行业的谈判说话权，加入科技产业、清洁动力产业和环保团体，共同敕令特朗普政府留在《巴黎协定》。关联词，当作主要谈判者，特朗普出于政事利益的考量，选用“问题从头界定”的策略减弱国内的得手集会，并最终使用否决权退出了该协定。
这次退群并非好意思国政府第一次抵抗国际表象答允，好意思国政府在将来的国际表象谈判中的举止和决策也可能再生变数。本文利用双层博弈表面试图有计划两任政府在《巴黎协定》上的决策，何况分析两任政府决策背后国际和国内层面的复杂博弈和政事考量，而非将“退群”决定单纯归结于特朗普总统的“不细目性”，以期为好意思国政府在《巴黎协定》中的表象政策有计划作念出些许孝顺，并为好意思国政府将来的国际表象举止提供模仿。
关节词：好意思国表象政策 巴黎协定 双层博弈
Abstract
Since taking office， the U.S. President Barack Obama had been publicly active in tackling climate change， and reached the Paris Agreement in his second term， which is also seen as a major climate legacy of his administration. However， the successor President Trump reversed the U.S. climate policy and announced to dump this agreement within half a year of taking office. This exit successfully unraveled the international climate achievement of the Obama administration， demonstrating the fragility of the Obama administration’s climate legacy. This paper focuses on the following question: how did international and domestic factors contribute to the acceptance of the Paris Agreement under the Obama administration and the withdrawal from it under the Trump administration?
This paper tries to use two-level game theory to explain these two different decisions on this agreement and analyze the international and domestic bargains of the U.S in the two periods. This paper draws the conclusion that the two-level game theory demonstrates strong explanatory power for these two decisions， and domestic factors， international factors and the chief negotiators play roles in different degrees in two cases.
The two-level game theory shows strong explanatory power for President Obama’s decision to join the Paris Deal， and international factors， domestic factors and the chief negotiators all play important roles in the government decision-making process. At the international level， the Obama administration sought to restore the U.S. leadership in global climate governance， and sent positive signals to the international community by reaching the historic joint announcement with China and committing $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund， expanding the possibility of reaching agreements with other major participants such as the European Union and developing countries. At the domestic level， the Obama administrations proposed the Clean Power Plan， echoing its international climate action， and the support from the high-tech industry， the clean energy industry and environmental groups also pushed the progress of the U.S. international climate efforts. However， the Republican-controlled Congress and the traditional energy industries were opposed to the U.S involvement in the Paris Agreement. Facing domestic resistance， as the chief negotiator， President Obama adopted the strategy of “issue redefinition” and “synergistic issue linkage” to expand domestic win-sets. However， domestic win-sets were still not large enough to win the ratification from the Congress， forcing the Obama administration to join this agreement by executive order without submitting it to the Senate for approval. This decision also simplified the exit process and increased the vulnerability of this outcome. Moreover， after the opposing efforts turned in vain， the traditional energy industries switched to the Republican candidates in the 2016 presidential election， adding the uncertainty of the future of this agreement.
Moreover， the two-level game theory also shows strong explanatory power for President Trump’s repudiation of the deal. In this case， international factors play a minor role in the decision-making process， while domestic factors and the chief negotiators play important roles in contributing to the decision. At the international level， the Trump administration believed that the Paris agreement is flawed in essence and performed passively in international climate talks. Subsequent climate talks in Marrakesh， Bonn and the G7 summit have made the Trump administration realize that the fundamental flaws in the agreement are hard to change and that renegotiation is highly unlikely. This decision reflects more of a domestic game. The Trump administration， which has a cabinet of mostly climate skeptics， has reversed the previous administration’s climate policies in an effort to shore up support among grassroots voters and revive the U.S. economy and employment. The mainstream voices in Congress have also urged the Trump administration to pull out of the deal. Yet， supportive interest groups standing on the “staying” side had the upper hand. In order to maintain the negotiating power in global energy matrix， the oil and gas industry and coal industry giants reversed their attitudes and joined the high-tech industry， clean energy industry and environmental groups， calling for the government to remain in the Paris Agreement. However， the chief negotiator， namely President Trump， adopted the strategy of “issue redefinition” to reduce domestic win-sets and eventually used the veto power to dump the agreement with the consideration of political interests.
This withdrawal is not the first time for the U.S. government to renege on international climate commitments， and its actions and decisions in future international climate negotiations can be thrown into doubt. This paper analyzes two government decisions on the Paris agreement with two-level game theory and digs out complicated game and political considerations， rather than put all blame for this exit on the “unpredictability” of President Trump. This paper hopes to make some contribution to the climate policy study of the U.S. government on the Paris Agreement and offer reference for the future U.S. international climate action.
Key words: U.S. climate policy Paris Agreement two-level game theoryav网址